Does Control Make a Difference? The Moral Foundations of Shareholder Liability for Corporate Wrongs (Článek, 2012) [WorldCat.org]
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Does Control Make a Difference? The Moral Foundations of Shareholder Liability for Corporate Wrongs
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Does Control Make a Difference? The Moral Foundations of Shareholder Liability for Corporate Wrongs

Autor Jonathan Crowe Pracoviště: T. C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland
Vydání/formát: Článek Článek : English
Zdroj:The Modern Law Review, v75 n2 (March 2012): 159-179
Jiné databáze: WorldCatWorldCat
Shrnutí:
The doctrine of limited liability, as traditionally understood, prevents shareholders from being held personally liable for corporate wrongs. Several authors have recently argued that the doctrine should be modified to make some or all shareholders individually liable for torts committed by corporations in which they hold shares. This article distinguishes three types of argument that might provide a moral basis for  Přečíst více...
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Detaily

Typ dokumentu Článek
Všichni autoři/tvůrci: Jonathan Crowe Pracoviště: T. C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland
ISSN:0026-7961
Poznámka o jazyku: English
Jednoznačný identifikátor: 5151356843
Ocenění:
Jiné tituly: Shareholder Liability for Corporate Wrongs
Odpovědnost: Jonathan Crowe

Anotace:

The doctrine of limited liability, as traditionally understood, prevents shareholders from being held personally liable for corporate wrongs. Several authors have recently argued that the doctrine should be modified to make some or all shareholders individually liable for torts committed by corporations in which they hold shares. This article distinguishes three types of argument that might provide a moral basis for shareholder liability in such cases. I contend that while these arguments support holding at least some shareholders liable for corporate torts, they fail to justify a general regime of unlimited pro rata shareholder liability. The level of control shareholders exercise over a company makes an important difference to their moral duties to compensate victims of corporate wrongdoing.

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