Does Control Make a Difference? The Moral Foundations of Shareholder Liability for Corporate Wrongs (Artículo, 2012) [WorldCat.org]
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Does Control Make a Difference? The Moral Foundations of Shareholder Liability for Corporate Wrongs

Autor: Jonathan Crowe Afiliación: T. C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland
Edición/Formato: Artículo Artículo : English
Fuente:The Modern Law Review, v75 n2 (March 2012): 159-179
Otras bases de datos: WorldCatWorldCat
Resumen:
The doctrine of limited liability, as traditionally understood, prevents shareholders from being held personally liable for corporate wrongs. Several authors have recently argued that the doctrine should be modified to make some or all shareholders individually liable for torts committed by corporations in which they hold shares. This article distinguishes three types of argument that might provide a moral basis for  Leer más
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Detalles

Tipo de documento Artículo
Todos autores / colaboradores: Jonathan Crowe Afiliación: T. C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland
ISSN:0026-7961
Nota del idioma: English
Identificador único: 5151356843
Premios:
Otros títulos: Shareholder Liability for Corporate Wrongs
Responsabilidad: Jonathan Crowe

Resumen:

The doctrine of limited liability, as traditionally understood, prevents shareholders from being held personally liable for corporate wrongs. Several authors have recently argued that the doctrine should be modified to make some or all shareholders individually liable for torts committed by corporations in which they hold shares. This article distinguishes three types of argument that might provide a moral basis for shareholder liability in such cases. I contend that while these arguments support holding at least some shareholders liable for corporate torts, they fail to justify a general regime of unlimited pro rata shareholder liability. The level of control shareholders exercise over a company makes an important difference to their moral duties to compensate victims of corporate wrongdoing.

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