Does Control Make a Difference? The Moral Foundations of Shareholder Liability for Corporate Wrongs (Articolo, 2012) [WorldCat.org]
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Does Control Make a Difference? The Moral Foundations of Shareholder Liability for Corporate Wrongs
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Does Control Make a Difference? The Moral Foundations of Shareholder Liability for Corporate Wrongs

Autore: Jonathan Crowe Appartenenza: T. C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland
Edizione/Formato: Articolo Articolo : English
Fonte:The Modern Law Review, v75 n2 (March 2012): 159-179
Altre banche dati: WorldCatWorldCat
Sommario:
The doctrine of limited liability, as traditionally understood, prevents shareholders from being held personally liable for corporate wrongs. Several authors have recently argued that the doctrine should be modified to make some or all shareholders individually liable for torts committed by corporations in which they hold shares. This article distinguishes three types of argument that might provide a moral basis for  Per saperne di più…
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Dettagli

Tipo documento Articolo
Tutti gli autori / Collaboratori: Jonathan Crowe Appartenenza: T. C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland
{0}0026-7961
Nota sulla lingua: English
Identificatore univoco: 5151356843
Riconoscimenti:
Altri titoli: Shareholder Liability for Corporate Wrongs
Responsabilità: Jonathan Crowe

Sinossi:

The doctrine of limited liability, as traditionally understood, prevents shareholders from being held personally liable for corporate wrongs. Several authors have recently argued that the doctrine should be modified to make some or all shareholders individually liable for torts committed by corporations in which they hold shares. This article distinguishes three types of argument that might provide a moral basis for shareholder liability in such cases. I contend that while these arguments support holding at least some shareholders liable for corporate torts, they fail to justify a general regime of unlimited pro rata shareholder liability. The level of control shareholders exercise over a company makes an important difference to their moral duties to compensate victims of corporate wrongdoing.

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