Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine "the moral sentiments": evidence from economic experiments. (Artículo, 2008) [WorldCat.org]
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Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine
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Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine "the moral sentiments": evidence from economic experiments.

Autor: Samuel Bowles Afiliación: Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA. samuel.bowles@gmail.com
Edición/Formato: Artículo Artículo : English
Fuente:Science (New York, N.Y.) v320 n5883 (20080620): 1605-9
Otras bases de datos: WorldCat; WorldCat; WorldCat
Resumen:
High-performance organizations and economies work on the basis not only of material interests but also of Adam Smith's "moral sentiments." Well-designed laws and public policies can harness self-interest for the common good. However, incentives that appeal to self-interest may fail when they undermine the moral values that lead people to act altruistically or in other public-spirited ways. Behavioral experiments  Leer más
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Tipo de documento Artículo
Todos autores / colaboradores: Samuel Bowles Afiliación: Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA. samuel.bowles@gmail.com
ISSN:0036-8075
Nota del idioma: English
Identificador único: 264501062
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Resumen:

High-performance organizations and economies work on the basis not only of material interests but also of Adam Smith's "moral sentiments." Well-designed laws and public policies can harness self-interest for the common good. However, incentives that appeal to self-interest may fail when they undermine the moral values that lead people to act altruistically or in other public-spirited ways. Behavioral experiments reviewed here suggest that economic incentives may be counterproductive when they signal that selfishness is an appropriate response; constitute a learning environment through which over time people come to adopt more self-interested motivations; compromise the individual's sense of self-determination and thereby degrade intrinsic motivations; or convey a message of distrust, disrespect, and unfair intent. Many of these unintended effects of incentives occur because people act not only to acquire economic goods and services but also to constitute themselves as dignified, autonomous, and moral individuals. Good organizational and institutional design can channel the material interests for the achievement of social goals while also enhancing the contribution of the moral sentiments to the same ends.

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